But if the legislator is mistaken about his object and takes a principle different from the one arising from the nature of things, the laws will weaken imperceptibly, the constitution will be altered, and the state will not cease being agitated until it is destroyed or changed, and invincible nature has regained her empire.

Rousseau Discourse on the Origin of Inequality

Every man is the builder of a temple . . . to the god he worships... We are all sculptors and painters, and our material is our own flesh and blood and bones.

Thoreau, Walden

Rousseau and Thoreau are both great figures in the zenith of industrialization. During which period the social and political structures has been changed in significant degrees. And both of them have taken inquiries into the mode of existence of humankind, and their relation to nature and society. Differing in space and time, history and culture, and writing styles, both thinkers investigated into the common themes which provide grounds for possible dialogues.

This essay is not a comparison on vast subjects that has been touched upon by both thinkers, but trying to read one from the perspective of the other, to problematize what seems consistent from one but contradictory to the other, and to provide possibility of solutions by framing inquiries in new languages and contexts that were not avalible to them at the time of writing.

Due to the scope of this essay, we will stay with a specific line of inquiries, namely, inquiries into the solution of society which has undergone transformative changes and individual corrupted, alienated, disempowered. We will first examine Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin of

Inequality, specifically the second part of the discourse, in order to introduce the condition and

problem concerning Rousseau later in writing the Social Contract. Next, we will move on to the

Social Contract and explore the solution posed towards human inequality and misery. We will

discover that the power of mores and customs plays in fact a significant factor implicitly in Rousseau’s formulation of a just society and governance, and we will realize a contradiction operating between the deduction of the significance of mores and the necessity of the legislator; specifically, if one of legislator’s primary tasks is to regulate mores, how is it possible for it to come to power democratically, in the society of which the general will has been erred and in need of protection. We will then move on to another paradox regarding the legislator, that is, how is it possible for this great figure, who possess power and virtues almost beyond the grasp of human, not to come into power, but simply to come into existence? With both of the question in hand, we move on to Thoreau’s Walden, reading it not as merely a disdust of society and returning to nature, but a recording of experiment which aims at precisely sheds light on the possibility of cultivation of virtues which are required for a just society. While Rousseau’s supposition of the notion of natural men and to which our the impossibility to return restricts his modality of solution to a social one, one engages with the perfectibility of human, Thoreau takes up the dimension of nature without historicization, deeming a turn outside society, not as an escapism, but as a resolution to society, in which one takes oneself as means and the very object of experimentation, with the objective of returning to society and bringing new possibility into existence.

Origin of Inequality

Rousseau’s solution to inequality, the Social Contract, lies fundamentally in his observation of the genesis of inequality which was formulated in his Discourse on Inequality. To trace its answer, and subsequently its failure to answer, it is necessary for us to first examine his Discourse, specifically, how inequality in society is formed as natural man falls into the realm of the social.

The Discourse on Inequality is divded into two parts. As Rousseau himself has stated, that the first part considers the faculties, including perfectibility, social virtues, which cannot deeloped by natural man themselves, but have to be developed by “chance coming together of several unconnected causes,” while part two investigates “the various chances happenings that were able to perfect human reason while deteriorating the species,” (DI 68) We will first examine the second part of the Discourse, which traces out a line of the development of human inequality via the process of language acquirement, and socialization, the invention of amour propre and property, and thus naturally leads to his discussion in the Social Contract.

The key in the second part of the Discourse and man’s downfall into corruption is language. Since language prescribes the world operating in certain ways, in using their language to achieve practical ends of survival, men finally realize that they are part of this world they are describing, that is, they reached a state of self-consciousness, a kind of reflection such that they themselves can also be described by others using language. The inception of the notion of self is intimately connected with the inception of property, since adjectives, as elements of language, are already prescribing qualities onto objects, this is the first-time human mind starts to understand the relationship of possession. With self-consciousness, men start to care about their own perception by others, which constitutes the very first development in morality: …Each one began to look at the others and to want to be looked at himself, and public esteem had a value. The one who sang or danced the best, the handsomest, the strongest, …, became the most highly regarded. And this was the first step toward inequality, and, at the same time, toward vice. For these first preferences were born vanity and contempt on the one hand, and shame and envy on the other. (73) Whereas language represents the formal possibility of understanding possessive relation, the material relation is realized the moment human becomes dependent upon each other, “as soon as one man realized that it was useful for a single individual to have provisions for two…property came into existence.” (74) It is after this moment of realization that men can possess not only properties like large, small, strong, weak…, but materials that are effective in enlarging such forms of inequality.

While men realizing themselves being differently from others with value judgement casted is the initiation of inequality, its further multiplication is generated by men’s desire to “show himself to be something other than what he in fact was,” from his moral urge towards merit and talents. (77) And as material possession starts to differentiate men between rich and poor, the rich, in order to wants to protect his properties, institute laws that are of his advantages, which “gave new fetters to the weak and new forces to the rich.” (79) We therefore observe, as Rousseau concludes at the end of part two, that there are different stages of inequality. It is the self-consciousness of men which realizes differences in personal qualities as the first stage. And wealth is the last stage for it is “the most immediately useful and…readily to buy all the rest.” (88) And one of the ways material possessions is useful is to institute laws, so that property laws and magistracy and finally arbitrary power are consecutively formed, and the poor are continually transformed into the weak, and finally into the slave. (87) The conclusion from part two of the Discourse therefore is: we realize the origin of human inequality lies in men’s consciousness of comparison, of realizing each of them are different and thereof wants to be the better ones. And this desire in turn differentiates them materially, which furthers inequality. We thus can identify a vicious circle of the recognition in the mind and the differentiation in the material, in which the more human realize they are different, the more they want to pursue the better, and the more they pursue the better, they in turn becomes even more different.

Social Contract

Just like his problematization of society has a dual process, a viscous circle, Rousseau’s solution in his Social Contract also seems to repeat this structure. At the end of book II of the

Social Contract, Rousseau identifies two principal objectives of every system of legislation, namely

liberty and equality. (SC BkII ch11 188) He goes on to say: Regarding equality, …, with regard to power, it should fall short of any violence and never be exercised except by virtue of rank and laws; and, with regard to wealth, no citizen should be so rich as to be capable of buying another citizen, and none so poor that he is forced to sell himself. This presupposes moderation in goods and power on the part of the great, and moderation in avarice and covetousness on the part of the lowly. (BkII ch11 189) To bring about equality, Rousseau claims, the legislation should limit the power and wealth of the individual. However, the latter part seems to be saying that this limitation is not enough, for even economic regulation tends to diminish such differences, individual still have this tendency to differentiate, which was deduced already in the Discourse, and which must also be regulated. So, the question is: how should the government to moderates ‘avarice and covetousness’, or, what does it even mean to moderates?

The answer was already hinted close to the ending of the Discourse. Rousseau was considering the “establishment of the body politic as a true contract between the populace and the leaders it chooses for itself” given “the populace has united all its wills into a single one…” (DI 85) This is an early formulation of the general will, which is essential to understanding Rousseau’s solution. In the Social Contract, he formulates the general will as “the general interest,” which “removes from the [private wills] the pluses and minuses that cancel each other out.” (SC BkII ch4 172) The general will “must be general in its object as well as in its essence; that it must derive from all in order to be applied to all…” and men must make judgement as if he is the subject under such constitution (BkII ch4 174).

The general will for Rousseau is indestructible (BkIV ch1 225) and always right (BkII ch3 172), but sometimes can be eluded, when, for example, an individual “sells his vote for money,” (BkIV ch1 225) for instead of he saying, “it is advantageous to the state,” he says “it is advantageous to this man or that party…” (BkIV ch1 225) This exemplifies what Rousseau mentioned earlier about how partial association can err the general will, which “would always result from the large number of small differences” becomes “a private opinion” which results from “a single difference.” (BkII ch3 173) Let us clarify the problem at this point: a just society is one in which men freely and unanimously given themselves to the social contract, (BkI Ch5 163) and this step secures the existence and constancy of the general will. The general will is always correct since men in this contract are considering the general good and not their particular interests, making every decision with generality in their essence as well as object. The problem is, once individual come into association, and express their will as groups, this will “becomes general…to its members and particular…to the state.” (BkII Ch3 173) Since general will is that which populace based on when it legislates: “…the subject matter about which a statute is enacted is general like the will that enacts it. It is this act I call a law,” (BkII ch6 179) once general will is evaded by particular interests, the law becomes unjust. Therefore, at this end of the chapter on law, we see Rousseau necessitates the existence of a legislator: The general will is always right, but the judgement that guides it is not always enlightened. It must be made to see objects as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear to it. The good path it seeks must be pointed out to it. It must be made safe from the seduction of private wills. It must be given as sense of time and place. It must weigh present, tangible advantages against the danger of distant, hidden evils. Private individuals see the good they reject. The public wills the good that it does not see. Everyone is equally in need of guides. The former must be obligated to conform their wills to their reason; the latter must learn to know what it wants. Then public enlightenment results in the union of the understanding and the will in the social body––hence, the full cooperation of the parts and finally the greatest force of the whole. Whence there arises the necessity of having a legislator. (BkII ch6 180) After all the deductions, we see Rousseau positions the possibility of an entire just society singlehandedly on an individual, namely the legislator, who brings out the general will and protect it from contaminated by the private interests. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss what precisely this legislator must do in order to achieve his purpose, and then consider how such a legislator is possible to even come into existence.

Problem of Mores

In the last chapter of book II, Rousseau classifies four types of law––political law, civil law, criminal law and a fourth law he did not name––of which “only political laws…are relevant to [his] subject” (BkII ch12 191), yet it is the last unnamed law that is in fact most important, powerful and upon which all other laws depend: To these three sorts of law is added a fourth, the most important of all. It is not engraved on marble or bronze, but in the hearts of citizens. It is the true constitution of the state. Every day it takes on new farces. When other laws grow old and die away, it revives and replaces them, preserves a people in the spirit of its institution, and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for that authority. I am speaking of mores, customs, and especially of opinion, a part of the law unknown to our statesmen but one on which depends the success of all the others: a part with which the great legislator secretly occupies himself, though he seems to confine himself to the particular regulations that are merely the arching of the vault, whereas mores, slower to arise, form in the end its immovable keystone. (BkII ch12 191) This is a dense passage, and we should carefully unpack. First, an obvious question naturally arises: if such type of law is so important, why did Rousseau reserve himself from talking about it? We will return to this question by examine elements here and there in the text that are related to this law, which is what Rousseau seems to say but can only bring them up in such an implicit manner, as even the legislator can only secretly occupy himself with it. Second, what does it means for this law to be the true constitution of the state, why on this law depends the success of all the others? We will examine the relation between these types of laws in the context of the relation of particular and general will, and further traces it back to the discussion of moral corruption in the Discourse.

In the Discourse, especially from the second part, we remember that all the moral sentiment such as pride, envy, etc. arise from the self-consciousness of men, they form a self- image and compare themselves with others in the eyes of other people, therefore they always want to have a better appearance. It is those sentiment that constitutes the perpetuation of inequality. Whenever someone consider themselves in making a decision, this decision is made based upon this person’s private interests. Thus, controlling inequality in a society presupposes a control of private interests in each person. Rousseau analogize the relation between private will and general will to the relation between mores and the laws: “Now, the less relationship there is between private wills and the general will, that is, between mores and the laws, the more repressive force ought to increase.” (BkIII ch1 193) It is clear from this quote that, while laws express the will of the general, mores embody that of the particular. And, as concluded from earlier passage, A just society keeps the general will from contaminated from the private wills, we see here we can modify the expression as: …keeps the [laws] from contaminated from the [mores].

This seems to be a reasonable answer as to why all other laws depends on this fourth law, namely, it is this fourth laws, the law of mores that, as an expression of the private wills, contains the possibility of corrupting other explicit laws, and it is the latter of which in turn expresses the general will, “rectifies natural relation,” and maintains material equality. (BkII ch11 190) We now understand why this implicit law is the most important for Rousseau, and we therefore will move on to talk about how exactly the legislator “secretly occupies himself” with such type of law, even Rousseau did not engage directly with such topic which he paradoxically deems the most important.

Before embarking on Rousseau’s perhaps unintentional discussion of the institution and regulation of this implicit laws, since one might still have doubt about the importance of mores and customs, let us confirm textually that Rousseau does think they are, as he stated, “the true constitution of the state.” (BkII ch12 191) First, in the discussion of Democracy, Rousseau stated that one of the presuppositions of the government is little or no luxury, for it incentivize people to pursue wealth in comparison with other, and he says “this is why a famous author [Montesquieu] has made virtue the principle of the republic. For all these conditions [little luxury and others] could not subsist without virtue.” (BkIII ch4 199) We also see in the chapter on voting, that “the manner in which general business is taken care of can provide a rather accurate indication of the present state of mores…the more harmony reigns…the more dominant too is the general will.” (BkIV ch2 226) And that, in the subsequent chapter, Rousseau claims election by lots “have few disadvantages in a true democracy, where, all things being equal both in mores and talents…but…there is no such thing as a true democracy.” (BkIV ch3 229) We see that it is precisely because mores are unequal that a government is required to regulate, and no regulation can success without taking in account of the current state of mores. At this point, we see Rousseau, although does not directly entertain with the law of customs and mores, does touched upon the intervention of formal constitution of the state, such as the mechanism of voting and election, with the laws of mores that constitute civil society, and deem it to be the most factor in legislation.

Rousseau believes the legislator should directly engage with the regulation of mores. He claims that the legislator “should be in a position to change human nature, to transform each individual…to alter man’s constitution in order to strengthen it; to substitute a partial and moral existence…” (BkII ch7 181) That is, one of the legislator’s tasks is to cultivate civic virtue. In the chapter on censorship, Rousseau again claims that “…the censorship can be useful for preserving mores…the censorship maintains mores by preventing opinions from becoming corrupt, by preserving their rectitude through wise applications, and sometimes even by making a determination on them when they are still uncertain.” (BkIV ch7 242) At this point, it is fairly clear that the legislator needs not only to execute the general will with power, to protract the general will with protection on virtue or mores, but also to actively guide the direction of the direction of mores, just like when Rousseau deducing the necessity of the legislator, he claimed, as I quoted earlier, that “[judgements] must be made to see objects as they are, and sometimes as they ought to appear to it.” (BkII ch6 180)

Problem of the Legislator

The importance of mores in Rousseau’s discussion of Social Contract and the necessity to regulate is obvious. But it is unclear Rousseau stated that the subject matter of his writing only engages directly with the more explicit laws. It is reasonable to speculate, I claim, that Rousseau might have realized a paradox in his formulation of government which, if stated explicitly, would have prevented the consistency of his writing. Even so, from the above discussion of mores and the legislator, we can tentatively identify this paradox.

We have concluded that one of the tasks of the legislator is to regulate mores and to cultivate civic virtue, not only simply execute the will with power, but to bring out the general will with prevention of the private associations and wills. Therefore, the task of the legislator is not only to intervene the branch of the power, but also the pranch of the will. The paradox lies here, it lies in the fact that the very legislator coming into power requires precisely this will which he will in turn regulate; we are again another circle.

In the legislator chapter, one of the difficulties in the work of legislation Rousseau presented us is that “the wise men [legislator] who want to speak to the common masses in the former’s own language rather than in the common vernacular cannot be understood by the masses.” (BkII ch7 182) For the legislator is a prophetic figure, its understanding and “overly general perspectives…are beyond [people]’s grasp.” (BkII ch7 182) Subsequently, Rousseau himself also came close to his own paradox: For an emerging people to be capable of appreciating the sound maxims of politics and of following the fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause. To social spirit that ought to be the work of that constitution would have to preside over the writing of the constitution itself. And men would be, prior to the advent of laws, what they ought to become by means of laws. Since, therefore, the legislator is incapable of using either force or reasoning, he must of necessity have recourse to an authority of a different order, which can compel without violence and persuade without convincing. (BkII ch7 182) This seems to be the advent of also the paradox of democracy, in which to elect a great legislator, who can cultivate civic virtue, itself already requires the existence of a virtuous society, without recourse to violence or some sort of transcendental authority. And to this, Rousseau did not seem to have provided a solution.

Technique de Soi

Rousseau not only did not resolve the above contradiction of how great legislators can come into power without already presuming a virtuous society, he did not even explicate how a great legislator itself can come into existence, for, from his description of the legislator, that it seems to be an impossible task for most of the people. Even at the first line of his legislator chapter, Rousseau writes that “discovering the rules of society…would require a superior intelligence…,” (BkII ch7 180) and later in the same chapter he says that such an undertaking “transcends human capacities and, to execute it, an authority that is nil.” (BkII ch7 182) We see Rousseau simply rejected the possibility of the existence of such a figure. Later in chapter ten, Rousseau gives a description of what this legislator would be like: “One that, finding itself bound by some union of origin, interest…has not yet felt the true yoke of laws. One that…can get along without other peoples and without which every other people can get along. One that…can be sufficient unto itself….” (BkII ch10 188) This legislator should “beheld all the passions of men without feeling any of them; who had no affinity with our nature, yet knew it through and through; whose happiness was independent of us, yet who nevertheless was willing to concern itself with ours…” (BkII ch7 180) With all these, in the following passages, I will argue that Thoreau’s Walden provides precisely the possibility of the emergence of this figure, as well as a formal possibility to the solution of the circle of legislator and virtuous society.

From the above description of the legislator, we can generalize a few features: first, the legislator must distance itself from the society; second, be able to stay alone and be self- sufficient; third, invested or have a potential to invest in humanity. Rousseau is unable to deduce such formal possibility of the existence of such a legislator. In the Discourse on Inequality, he rejected the possibility of returning to the natural state of men and desocialization. (105 Note ix to part one) However, distancing from society does not mean a complete return to nature, to annihilate self-consciousness, but merely to separate oneself from society so that the corruption of morality and the effect of private interests from different party do not affect oneself as much.

Foucault has known to be a social critic who investigate the relationship between social and individual, especially the normative structures established in the areas of sciences, institutions, surveillance, governmentality and law. However, in the last half decade of his life, Foucault made an abrupt turn into the investigation into the ancient, and their practice of self- care. Foucault turned to the ancient not because he is stopped interested in society, but precisely that he was trying to find a solution and a possibility of resistance. If Rousseau represents the former Foucault’s investigation into how societal effects are not only external to us, but establish our very selves in every micro aspect of daily life (mores, customs, self-image by socialization), Thoreau, then, would embody the later Foucault who turned from consideration on how one exert power on other, to that on how one exert power on oneself, which secure oneself from the exertion of power from society and thus attain a transformation which was never possible beforehand.

The following paragraphs explores several themes in Walden including Thoreau’s intension of self-seclusion, solitude, relation to society and nature, which all sheds light on how civic virtue can be cultivated without socio-political intervention as well as the possibility of great legislators. First, we must differentiate the intension of Thoreau living by Walden and his intension in writing Walden. The first sentence of Walden made clear that, in writing this book, Thoreau wants to “brag as lustily as chanticleer in the morning…if only to wake my neighbors up.” (5) Yet Thoreau also wrote: “I went to the woods because I wished to live deliberately, to front only the essential facts of life, and see if I could not learn what it had to teach, and not, when I came to die, discover that I had not lived.” (65) Apparently, Thoreau’s deliberation into the woods has an objective, that is, to learn from the essentials of life. And the purpose of writing this book is to share it with the public, to “wake his neighbors up.” Thoreau extended his metaphor of sleep and waking throughout the book. In beginning the example of building railroad, for example, Thoreau writes “We must learn to reawaken and keep ourselves awake, not by mechanical aids, but by an infinite expectation of the dawn, which does not forsake us in our soundest sleep.” (65) If the purpose of writing Walden is to provide a possibility that Thoreau himself have discovered through this experiment, the meaning of living near the pond for two years seems to be, in some sense, waking himself up. Just like Rousseau positioned two original virtues of self-preservation and pity withing human, even after they are socially corrupted, Thoreau also believes human has innately the ability to be waken up: “We must learn to reawaken and keep ourselves awake, not by mechanical aids, but by an infinite expectation of the dawn, which does not forsake us in our soundest sleep. I know of no more encouraging fact than the unquestionable ability of man to elevate his life by a conscious endeavor.” (64) Even the whole Walden is constituted of mostly recording of facts instead of theoretical argument, we can without difficulty identify a structure of writing throughout the book, namely, Thoreau’s gain in understanding with each day his encounter with his environment, and there is always a rupture in his thinking after such encounters. For example, Thoreau believes education such as hunting and fishing is necessary, for he thinks that many, especially teenagers, have forgotten this practice and will easily project human value onto animal, been overly sympathetic and “phil-anthropic.” (145) Yet, when he actually fished himself, he realized sometimes it is not the human emotion but a more primitive, perhaps instinctual, one, similar to Rousseau’s contradistinction between amour propre and pity, “I have found repeatedly, of late years, that I cannot fish without falling a little in self-respect. I have tried it again and again. I have skill at it, and, like many of my fellows, a certain instinct for it…” (145) Similarly, when the fire that used to warm his house burned his house, Thoreau first felt like “had lost a companion” and later “could no longer sit and look into the fire,” (172) as if a tamed and domesticated pet suddenly rise up and against the will of the human, and returning back into the nature.

This sort of thinking directed by experience recurred again and again in Walden, including Thoreau’s contemplation on solitude, on friendship, on human nature, on material necessity, and on government. What is essential to these is the fact that, it is his environment which piqued and initiated his thinking. The conclusion this essay wishes to drawn is not any specific new understanding of any aspect of human life, but that the very possibility of the new knowledge production lies in the encounter with the foreign, for it not only imbues experience into our already existing subjectivity, but it changes the very categories of understanding through which we perceive and make decisions. It is by distancing himself from the humanity, society, government, Thoreau was able to contemplate upon and conclude about which new insights regarding new possibilities of our social ways of being, and completed this book to encourage similar practices.

Returning to the problem of the legislator and civic virtue, we see significant parallels between the qualities Rousseau believes a great legislator should have and the themes of Walden which Thoreau has pondered upon, such as going away from the yoke of laws, beholding men’s passion and morality yet have no affinity to it, self-sufficient, etc. Walden provides, therefore, a possibility of cultivation of virtue by immersing oneself in significantly different environ, only to later see more clearly its original state of being.

Rousseau traced the origin of inequality and tended to provide a solution. He insightfully observed the current state of inequality is caused by human’s corrupted morality, a cultivated desire to be perceived better than other in the opinions of people. He posited in every human a potential to be perfected, namely, the more primitive tendency to only care for the self and pity others, which constitute the general will when human come together without falling into contradiction. However, the general will, that which should find expression in law, is often corrupted by particular interests and caused differentiation in material wealth, which will in turn enlarge the divide. Therefore, Rousseau posited, a legislator is needed to protect and bring out the general will of a society.

Yet, two paradox remains in his formulation. First, it is unclear how such a legislator could come to power in a corrupted society without recourse to violence or transcendental authority like religion. Second, it is also unclear how such a legislator, who possess extraordinary virtues, could even come into existence. To these two questions, Thoreau seems to provide an answer. During a time of political and social corruption, human is unable to see unclearly, individually or collectively, their possibilities of becoming. If great legislator is not on the table, how should one cultivate one’s own virtue? Thoreau’s answer is simple: to reexamine the social contract, to ponder upon what is really essential to each and every individual life, and to experiment with one’s life which breaks the norm and everydayness of our increasingly structured society. Since embodied experience is not simply aesthetics, it transforms our very faculties to willing, thinking, and therefore, judging. It brings new form of understanding the human condition and the world we inhabit. With this, Thoreau seems to be able to answer Rousseau leftover question which he himself was not able to answer.

Lastly, if anything, this very dialogue between Rousseau and Thoreau seems to infinitely connect with our conditions of inhabiting this desert, and the idea of Deep Springs. To get into this place, everyone has thought about why one wants to come to such a secluded place. To venerate nature? To escape from society? To search for the otherworldly? I guess the answer has already aforementioned. By preparing a service of life, and the voice of the desert, L. L Nunn’s quote has perplexed generations of applicants when they are writing their essays. What are them, really? It seems to be precisely what the cultivation of virtue in time of crisis and depression.

Foucault calls the care of themselves in the ancients ‘self-technique’, for they took great pain in transforming themselves by deliberately positing themselves under uncommon conditions, exerting power on themselves to attain a vastly different state of existence. In a society that is steadily globalized, homogenized, and precarious, it is therefore more and more urgent for one to not just ponder upon ways out of the predicament, but, perhaps more importantly, to take oneself as means, to transform oneself, with the objective of seeing what was happening more clearly. This, I deem, is what is truly valuable about Deep Springs.

Work Cited Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Basic Political Writings, Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2011 Thoreau, Henry David, Walden Civil Disobedience, and Other Writings, New York, NY: W. W.

Norton & Company, Inc., 2008